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Ivanova, Irina. Jagannathan, Meera. Jamieson, Dave. Kaplan, Ezra, and Jo Ling Kent. Kochan, Thomas A. Kimball, Duanyi Yang, and Erin L. Kruzel, John. Lafer, Gordon, and Lola Loustaunau. Economic Policy Institute, July Maryland State of Office of Legal Counsel. Miller, Leila. McNicholas, Celine. McNicholas, Celine, and Margaret Poydock. Economic Policy Institute, October Unlawful: U. Economic Policy Institute, December Muller, Eleanor. Pappas, Lista. Paul, Kari. Rhinehart, Lynn, and Celine McNicholas.
Economic Policy Institute, May Economic Policy Institute, August 30, Scheiber, Noam, and Daisuke Wakabayashi. Selyukh, Alina. Agency Rules. Shierholz, Heidi. Economic Policy Institute, January State of California. Teamsters International Brotherhood of Teamsters. April 15, March Updated June 6, July 15, Western, Bruce, and Jake Rosenfeld.
Wage Inequality. Wilson, Valerie, and Elise Gould. Economic Policy Institute, June Wilson, Valerie, and William M. Rodgers III. Economic Policy Institute, September Wong, Julia Carrie. See related work on Collective bargaining and right to organize Right to work Economic inequality Coronavirus. See related work on Collective bargaining and right to organize , Right to work , Economic inequality , and Coronavirus.
Download PDF Press release. Following are just a few of the benefits, according to the latest data: Unionized workers workers covered by a union contract earn on average Black and Hispanic workers get a larger boost from unionization.
Black workers represented by a union are paid Hispanic workers represented by unions are paid Table 1. Workers and the NLRB set union election procedures. The employer is not involved. Employers have free rein to hold captive audience meetings where they deliver anti-union messages without an opportunity for the union to respond. Employers are prohibited from forcing workers to attend captive audience meetings. Workers wait months and even years to be reinstated or receive back pay after they were unlawfully discharged by their employer for engaging in activities protected under the National Labor Relations Act NLRA.
The NLRB is required to go to court and get an injunction to immediately reinstate workers if the NLRB believes the employer has illegally retaliated against workers for union activity.
Employers who commit violations under the NLRA face civil penalties, including individual liability for responsible corporate officials. Workers are prohibited from bringing civil lawsuits against their employer for violating their NLRA rights. Workers gain a private right to civil action. Employers are allowed to force workers to sign arbitration agreements in which they waive the right to collective or class action litigation. Collective and class action waivers are banned.
Employers are allowed to misclassify workers as independent contractors without violating the NLRA. Employers have the ability to drag out the process of bargaining over a first collective bargaining agreement. Employers must follow a process for reaching a first agreement when workers organize, a process that uses mediation and then, if necessary, binding arbitration, to enable the parties to reach a first agreement.
Workers face limits on their fundamental right to strike. Workers gain their full fundamental right to strike because the PRO Act removes prohibitions on secondary strikes, prohibits employers from permanently replacing striking workers, and bans the use of proactive lockouts by employers in which employers lock out employees who want to keep working. This helps us factor in these differences, which allows us to come closer to identifying the pure relationship between RTW legislation and wages.
In Table 2 , we construct a regression model, starting with the most general and building up to a model that controls for the full range of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is always the natural log of hourly wages, and the variable of interest is an indicator variable taking on the value one when the worker lives in a RTW state and zero otherwise. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table A1.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include year indicators. Log of hourly wage is the dependent variable. Allocated wages are excluded. Individual-level labor market controls include variables for full-time status, hourly status, union status, occupations, and industries.
State-level labor market controls include the unemployment rate. The results of the simple model which only controls for year fixed-effects mimic the differences in wages found in the descriptive statistics and are displayed in the first column. The coefficient of As with worker characteristics, the industry and occupation mix in the state could affect the average wage.
Again, controlling for these differences allows us to better isolate the relationship between RTW status and wages. As expected, the coefficient on the RTW indicator moves closer to zero as shown in the second column of Table 2 , and wages in RTW states are found to be 8.
Again, these results are in line with previous research. Following Gould and Shierholz , the third column of Table 2 includes additional state-level variables pertaining to the economic conditions—measured by the state unemployment rate—and differences in the cost of living across states.
Averages for these continuous variables are found at the bottom of Table 1. In addition to the cost-of-living variables, the wage regressions reported are quite standard, using controls race, gender, five education categories, industry, occupation, experience, union status, hourly status, part-time status, marriage status, and unemployment rate that are very common in labor economic research examining the determinants of wages Blanchflower and Oswald Using the same full set of controls used in Gould and Shierholz , we find a similar result where wages in RTW states are significantly lower, in both statistical and economic terms, than in non-RTW states.
On average, RTW laws are associated with wages that are 3. As with the earlier regressions, this result is consistent with the findings of Gould and Shierholz , which, using data, also found a wage differential of 3. As compared with model three, this change leaves the RTW penalty essentially unchanged it falls from 3. In his recent paper, Sherk critiques the Gould and Shierholz methods.
Since this paper serves as an update to their methods, we use the most recent data presented here to test some of his criticisms. Primarily, we defend our methods against the idiosyncratic empirical model choices Sherk uses.
Secondarily, we explore some suggestions Sherk makes regarding the cost-of-living methodology to control for possible measurement error. As shown in Table 3 , and as will be discussed in detail below, in all cases we find that his suggestions do not change, in a statistically or economically significant way, the estimated RTW wage differential. All of the models in Table 3 should be compared against the final model in Table 2. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table A2.
Labor market controls include variables for full-time status, hourly status, union status, state unemployment rate, occupations, and industries.
Second-stage results are displayed; first-stage results are available upon request. Here, we address the question of possible measurement error first before moving on to concerns over our model specification. Sherk suggests that simply putting cost-of-living variables on the right-hand side of a regression may produce inaccurate estimates. It is clear that our earlier findings are robust to using the instrumental variable regression, and we therefore find that extra step unnecessary.
More broadly, Sherk makes several claims in justifying his idiosyncratic regression specification that finds no RTW wage penalty. We find most of these claims unconvincing. In the remainder of this section, we address these model specification issues. Sherk suggests that Gould and Shierholz over-control for labor market features that could have been impacted over time by states being either a RTW state or not.
Specifically, he asserts that labor market controls used in Gould and Shierholz —occupations, industry, unemployment, full-time status—bias results downward for RTW states because when controlling for these variables, Gould and Shierholz eliminate some of the positive effects of RTW laws on wages through indirect economic benefits. Among these, only the exclusion of occupations has any reasonable rationale in standard wage equations, though even that is questionable in this context.
Some labor economists have argued that occupations do not belong in wage equations because they are too co-determined and statistically collinear with educational attainment to provide useful information i. Furthermore, the objective here is to compare similar workers, not examine the returns to education, a common use of a log wage model.
In determining whether a party is bargaining in good faith, the Board will look at the totality of the circumstances. The duty to bargain in good faith is an obligation to participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement.
This implies both an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement as well as a sincere effort to reach a common ground. The additional requirement to bargain in "good faith" was incorporated to ensure that a party did not come to the bargaining table and simply go through the motions. There are objective criteria that the NLRB will review to determine if the parties are honoring their obligation to bargain in good faith, such as whether the party is willing to meet at reasonable times and intervals and whether the party is represented by someone who has the authority to make decisions at the table.
Conduct away from the bargaining table may also be relevant. For instance if an Employer were to make a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employees employment without bargaining, that would be an indication of bad faith.
The amount of dues collected from employees represented by unions is subject to federal and state laws and court rulings. The NLRA allows employers and unions to enter into union-security agreements, which require all employees in a bargaining unit to become union members and begin paying union dues and fees within 30 days of being hired. Even under a security agreement, employees who object to full union membership may continue as 'core' members and pay only that share of dues used directly for representation, such as collective bargaining and contract administration.
Known as objectors, they are no longer full members but are still protected by the union contract. Unions are obligated to tell all covered employees about this option, which was created by a Supreme Court ruling and is known as the Beck right. Considering that evidence indicates that right-to-work bills do not raise wages or create jobs, the policy case for national right-to-work legislation is nonexistent.
A national right-to-work bill would simply take a bad wage trend countrywide. But there is another force at play, which helps explain why a national right-to-work bill can count on repeated introductions in Congress: Right to work is a critical tool for special interests in asserting corporate power over worker power and diminishing the impact of worker power in the democratic process.
Unionized workers are more likely to vote, be politically active, and contribute to charity. Moreover, unions are one of the few organized groups that have the capacity to successfully advocate for the economic interests of working people. Yet, in the United States, corporate interest groups have engaged in a coordinated, strategic, decadeslong effort to weaken the power of workers. Since the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act of , also called the Taft-Hartley Act, state right-to-work laws have gradually spread throughout the country, state by state, as a result of anti-worker activism.
These laws have been promoted and advanced by the same anti-worker groups pushing other policies that diminish worker power. The Chamber considers right to work a top priority, and state affiliate chambers of commerce have been instrumental in organizing the push for right-to-work laws locally.
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